

SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 April 1952

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SUBJECT : Post-Mortem on Intelligence Weaknesses Revealed in the Preparation of NIE-35, "Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid-1952," dated 4 March 1952

ENCLOSURE: IAC List of Intelligence Weaknesses Revealed in the Preparation of NIE-35/1

1. The IAC representatives have examined intelligence weaknesses revealed in the preparation of NIE-35/1. This post-mortem, the first of its kind, has been a trial effort designed to examine whether such a procedure might be of benefit to subsequent National Estimates on the same subject. The IAC representatives agree that this pilot undertaking has been worthwhile.

2. The principal summarized conclusions reached at the post-mortem sessions concerning NIE-35 are, in order of priority:

- a. National Estimates on Indochina suffer from insufficient reliable intelligence on Viet Minh developments and on Chinese Communist capabilities in South China.
- b. National Estimates on Indochina suffer from the heavy dependence of the US upon French sources.

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- c. National Estimates would benefit from better coordination between the field and Washington during the estimating period, and within the field itself.

3. Enclosure A is an agreed list of intelligence weaknesses. These items are not intended to constitute intelligence requirements in themselves; rather, they are general areas where the IAC representatives feel that NIE-35/1 suffered from lack of adequate reliable intelligence.

4. It is recommended that the IAC take the following action:

- a. Approve the conducting of post-mortems to consider intelligence weaknesses revealed in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates, and formally authorize the Assistant Director for National Estimates and the IAC agency representatives to establish the necessary procedures along the lines followed for NIE-35/1;
- b. Approve the submission to it of future agreed post-mortem conclusions and lists of intelligence weaknesses, similar to the present document and attachment; and,

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- c. Note the attached list of intelligence weaknesses and refer it to CIA for discussion with appropriate IAC agency representatives to determine specific action indicated.

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